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PEOPLE FIRST, NATIONS SECOND
A NEW ROLE FOR THE UNITED NATIONS

Jackson Nyamuya Maogoto*
…we have probably reached a stage in the ethical and psychological evolution of Western
civilization in which the massive and deliberate violation of human rights will no longer
be tolerated.
Perez dé Cuellar (1991)

INTRODUCTION
The tragedy of East Timor coming so soon after that of Kosovo has
focused attention again on the weaknesses of previous United Nations
missions that have been ad hoc, reactive, and narrowly focused on solving
the international emergency of the moment. The United Nations and its
Members must focus on the need for timely intervention to save civilian
populations from mass slaughter. It must adopt a new role as the assertive
custodian of human rights because the use of its enforcement powers in the
domestic affairs of rogue States may have a deterrent effect. Therefore, it
should lead the way in defining its interventionist role in the emerging
international norm of humanitarian intervention.
THE UNITED NATIONS’ ROLE
The conduct of national elections has become one of the most visible and
concrete aspects of United Nations involvement in the domestic affairs of
States today.1 However, its participation in the domestic affairs of States
has been overly cautious and mainly through the supervision and/or
monitoring of elections at the invitation of the host State. This recognises
that the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in domestic
affairs are fundamental principles and key pillars of the United Nations
Charter. In practice, this usually means a request by States for campaign
and poll monitoring or for technical, financial and security assistance from
the organisation. Since 1990 the United Nations has been involved in the
elections in many States undergoing political transformation including
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Albania, Angola, Cambodia, Haiti, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique,
Nicaragua and South Africa.
The form and extent of United Nations intervention are set to change if the
historic addresses of Secretary-General Kofi Annan and President Bill
Clinton at the 54th Annual Session of the General Assembly on 20 and 21
September 1999 respectively are anything to go by.2 Both leaders alluded
to the fact that rogue states should not expect their borders to protect them
in the face of massive, organised and systematic violations of human rights.
Further, Kofi Annan pointed out that there was nothing in the Charter to
preclude the recognition that there were rights beyond borders.
These pronouncements have come in the wake of heinous atrocities
committed by States, including deliberate, massive and systematic tortures
and executions by both State and non-State actors in various corners of the
world.3 They have happened at a time when State actions have been under
more international scrutiny and many of them are under the control of
oppressive national regimes whose political architecture began during the
post-World War II era.4 When democratic changes swept through Eastern
Europe, Asia and Africa in the 1990s and the citizenry clamoured for
democracy, transparency and accountability in government, the regimes
were vicious in the face of these challenges to their political authority and
civil governance styles.5 They used the doctrine of sovereignty and the
principle of self-determination as mantles to defend against outside
interference and sought to address their abuse and misconduct in domestic
affairs by the abridgment of fundamental human rights.6
2

The text of the speeches can be accessed at the following URL
<http://unbisnet.un.org/webpac-bic/wgbroker>.
3
Examples are the 1992 ethnic cleansing frenzy by the Serbs during the break-up of
Yugoslavia, the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the brutal struggle in Liberia, and the
bloodbath in East Timor.
4
For example see Chirot D, Modern Tyrants: the Power and Prevalence of Evil in our Age
(1994, Free Press, New York); Davidson B, The Black Man’s Burden and the Curse of the
Nation State (1992, James Currey, London).
5
Examples are: (1) the brutal repression of opposition meetings in Kenya in 1992
following calls for multi-partyism in a de jure one party state; (2) the crackdown on
political activists and arbitrary detentions in Nigeria in 1995 after the annulment of
civilian elections by the military regime; (3) the high-handed handling by Indonesia
following the 1998 Jakarta riots that toppled Suharto from power; and (4) the political
repression in Burma that was targeted at pro-democracy activists.
6
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During the 1960s and 1970s socialist and third world States dominated the
General Assembly.7 They construed the self-determination principle in
several key international instruments of that period narrowly and excluded
the international scrutiny of cases where political rights were denied to
their citizens.8 It was ironic that the worst human rights offenders were
often the most vocal advocates of the principle of self-determination.
Against this background, it is suggested that it would be more pragmatic in
a changed world order for the United Nations to develop and advance
human rights and become its custodian. If accepted, the organisation
should be able to use it as justification for its interventionist role, including
the use of military force where appropriate.9
Principles on self-determination, State sovereignty and involvement in the
domestic affairs of States should not hinder such express responsibility
supporting human rights.10 The human rights responsibilities of the global
community should not be driven by or seen as a mere public relations
exercise. There are international instruments on human rights including the
Charter, the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights,11 the 1967
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”),12 the 1966
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(“ICESCR”)13 and the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. Professor Louis
Henkin has referred to them as a collective International Bill of Rights14
representing a global consensus that an international responsibility for
human rights exists. In reality, the position is complex because the United
Nations is an organisation of States that are represented by governments,
7

They included the USSR, Peoples Republic of China, Iraq, Syria, Mexico and virtually
all the new independent African States.
8
Cassesse, “The General Assembly in historical perspective 1945-1989” in Alston P
(editor), The United Nations and Human Rights (1992, Clarendon Press, Oxford) 40-46.
9
The intervention in East Timor by a United Nations authorised international force
mandated to bring law and order to a territory, to which an independent nation-state lays
claim, is counter to the traditional United Nations policy of intervention in a situation with
a supposedly “well-defined international dimension.”
10
Crosette, “China and others reject pleas that the United Nations halt civil wars”, New
York Times, 23 September 1999 at <http://www.nytimes.com/library/wo…1/092399nati
ons-intervention.html>; Leopold, “China castigates west on humanitarian intervention”,
Reuters News Agency, 25 September 1999 at <http://biz.yahoo.com/rf/990922/bcr. html>.
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some of which are major violators of human rights.15
Following the end of the Cold War, the United Nations developed new
roles concerning its peacekeeping efforts. For example, military-style
humanitarian intervention and enforcement actions have occurred in places
like Somalia, Iraq and more recently in Bosnia and East Timor. However,
such action has not always been implemented. Owing to superpower
hostility to anything substantial in peacekeeping, former United Nations
Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold devised the Concept and Guiding
Principles for the United Nations Emergency Forces.16 This was a
compromise solution that used lightly armed units of military personnel
who acted more like policemen than soldiers do. To meet today’s needs,
the Security Council should lower the criteria when considering the
appropriate conditions for peacekeeping and devise formal rules of
engagement for peacekeepers that are sufficient to meet the needs of the
conflict, taking into consideration the area to which the forces are sent.
This would change peacekeeping into peacemaking.
Sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence as norms have
weakened over time. The growing body of human rights law and the
developing practice of the Security Council under Article 39 of the Charter
in Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia and East Timor all point to an emerging
customary norm of United Nations humanitarian intervention. These have
occurred where humanitarian violations had been severe or had the
slightest trans-boundary effect. It may be argued that this norm was
crystallised when the organisation authorised intervention in East Timor.
As the Security Council liberalises the meaning of “threat to the peace” to
include non-military threats, the likelihood of future humanitarian
intervention will rise. As it increasingly encounters threats to the safety of
its peacekeepers, it should be prepared to exercise a level of force that goes
beyond mere self-defence.
In East Timor, InterFET was replaced by the United Nations Assistance
15

See Goodrich LM, The United Nations in a Changing World (1974, Columbia
University Press, New York) 2.
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United Nations Department of Public Information, The Blue Helmets: A review of
United Nations Peace-keeping, 18 UN DOC. DP1/1065, Sales No. E.90.I.18 (1990) 47-48.
This principles were devised by Hammarskjold for the UNEF I forces. The principles in
this paper were not initially penned by the Secretary General, but reflect precepts which
have developed through subsequent peacekeeping operations.
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Mission in East Timor (“UNAMET”).17 The change in the peace-making
mandate of the original international force for East Timor with a traditional
peacekeeping mandate clearly indicates that the United Nations is
reviewing the military dimensions of its forces. This addresses the question
raised by the United Nations Protection Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina
(“UNPROFOR”), namely, what is an acceptable level of force consistent
with “all necessary measures” that United Nations authorised missions may
use to deliver aid to those in need? Are United Nations troops allowed to
use force in “anticipatory” self-defence?
As original peace-making missions mandated to use force such as InterFET
are launched the rules of engagement and the authority for the use of force
should be modified and enunciated articulately. However, the stakes are
high. The safety of peacemakers, the continued viability of the collective
security structure of the United Nations and the maintenance of
international peace and security in future operations are all dependent on
the ability of the organisation to respond to this challenge.18
USE OF FORCE – HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Peacekeeping and peace enforcement originate in Chapter VII of the
Charter. Inter alia, the Charter is based on principles of sovereignty, nonintervention and the peaceful settlement of international disputes. Although
peacekeeping is not explicit in the Charter, it has evolved over the past 50
years into a well developed concept governed by a distinct set of principles.
When the Cold War ended, the United Nations took on a new and
aggressive role as a peacemaker that used military force. Iraq’s aggression
in Kuwait was met by an international coalition of armed forces authorised
by the organisation. The humanitarian crisis precipitated by the Iraqi
oppression of the Kurds and the inability to supply food and assistance to
the civilian population in war-ravaged Somalia presented the organisation
with new challenges. The issues had political, military, international and
domestic implications. But it was the recent humanitarian intervention in
17

Security Council Resolution 1264 of 1999.
The Clinton administration introduced very stringent guidelines for future participation
in international peacekeeping operations. The United States would only participate if there
have been grave threats to international peace and security, major disasters which require
relief, or “gross violations of human rights”: “US eyes new criteria for peacekeeping
missions”, Chicago Sun Times, 30 January 1994 at 36.
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East Timor by an international force expressly authorised to use force to
bring about law and order in the territory and to protect fundamental
human rights that shook the United Nation’s key pillars, the principles of
sovereignty and non-intervention.
Peacekeeping has seen a number of evolutionary stages. It began with the
use of force in self-defence only. From there it moved on to a goodwill
presence that was authorised by a host government. The next step was
active military action by international forces authorised by the United
Nations against aggressive governments and more recently the world
witnessed the humanitarian peacemaking efforts of the international force
in East Timor. The main aim of the efforts was to halt human rights
violations and restore law and order in a territory to which a sovereign
State had earlier laid claim. Such efforts had been characterised by the use
of all necessary force in the peacekeeping and peace enforcement action
and a simultaneous lack of goodwill by the host government.
Article 2 of the Charter provides the twin norms of State sovereignty and
the non-use of force. The prohibition extends to the use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any State within the terms
of Article 2(3) of the Charter:
All members shall refrain in their international relations from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the
purposes of the United Nations.
Article 2(3) is broader than Articles I-II of the 1928 General Treaty for the
Renunciation of War,19 commonly known as “the Briand/Kellog Pact” or
Pact of Paris and for all intents and purposes has superseded the BriandKellog Pact.20 Generally speaking, the Briand/Kellog Pact renounces war
as an instrument of national policy. It prohibits the use and threat of use of
force and war ceased to be a national right. It provides:
Article I
The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their
19

94 League of Nations Treaty Series 57.
In spite of this, this treaty has never been terminated. For more discussion refer to
Harris DJ, Cases and Materials on International Law (1998, Sweet & Maxwell, London)
861-862.
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respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution
of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of
national policy in their relations with one another.
Article II
The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all
disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may
be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by
pacific means.
Following the aftermath of World War II, war was cast as an international
crime. The 1919 League of Nations Covenant21 in Articles 15 and 16
sought to limit resort to war and, as seen above, the Briand/Kellog Pact did
likewise.
Although Article 2(4) was first thought to outlaw any use of force by a
State against another State, exceptions to this provision were subsequently
used to justify unilateral interventions.22 The following provision in Article
51 was an exception expressly built into the Charter:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a
Member.
This provision permits enforcement actions that the Security Council
authorises. However, there are implicit exceptions to Article 2(4) that are
derived from the provision itself based on the argument that it prohibits the
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of
another State. However, it does not apply to an intervention that is not
intended to even temporarily occupy the State’s territory or interfere with
its political autonomy or sovereignty.23 Nonetheless, this argument is now
under siege because both Secretary-General Kofi Annan and President Bill
Clinton pointed out during the 54th Annual Session of the General
Assembly that rogue states should not expect their borders to protect
them.24 They argued that international concern for human rights took
21

16 United Kingdom Treaty Series 4.
Henkin L, The Use of Force: Law and US Policy in Right v Might: International Law
and Use of Force (1989, Council on Foreign Relations Press, New York) 38.
23
Ibid 39-40.
24
See discussion above.
22
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precedence over claims of non-interference in domestic matters.25
The doctrine of state sovereignty, long protected by the principles of nonintervention and self-determination in the domestic affairs of States, is
recognised as customary international law and enshrined in the Charter.
Further, Article 2(7) acknowledges the following:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state.
However, the provision is limited by an exception that allows the
“application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII”. Article 2(7)
prohibits the United Nations, not States, from intervening in the domestic
affairs of Member States.26 However, in practice, the principle of nonintervention is eroded whenever States commit themselves to intervene
when called upon by the United Nations for the greater good of the
international community.27 The large body of human rights law that has
developed in conventional and customary law has also contributed to this
and the development of Article 2(7), which indicates that violations of
internationally recognised standards are not always matters that fall
completely within a State’s domestic jurisdiction. This erosion of Article
2(7) has contributed in part to the increase in United Nations interventions
in the post Cold War era,28 which in turn has sometimes led to complex
operations that have elements of peacekeeping and peace enforcement.
The trend mirrors the effects of globalisation and the numerous treaties and
conventions that States enter into. It has reduced the world into a global
village where actions, whether military, political or economic, by one State
may adversely affect a neighbouring State or States.29 Thus, sovereignty
25

See Chirot D, Modern Tyrants: the Power and Prevalence of evil in our Age (1994, Free
Press, New York) 3.
26
See Kartashkin, “Human rights and humanitarian intervention” in Damrosch LF and
anor (editors), Law and Force in the New International Order (1991, Westview Press,
Oxford).
27
Scheffer, “Toward a modern doctrine of humanitarian intervention”, (1992) 22
University of Toledo Law Review 253, 262.
28
Half of the 26 United Nations authorised missions have been after the Cold War ended.
29
Examples are the mass trans-boundary movement of refugees and regional tension
created by arms testing.
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has undergone the metamorphosis from individual supremacy, which
accompanies the birth of the sovereign State, to collective responsibility
that is consonant with globalisation and the contemporary cohesiveness of
the international community. The notions that sovereignty does not entitle a
government to kill its own people and that outsiders have a duty to take
action if it occurs are captured by Kofi Annan who surmised that nothing in
the Charter precluded a recognition that there were rights beyond borders.
PEACEKEEPING
Generally, there are two categories of peacekeeping, observer missions and
peacekeeping forces. The United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation
(“UNTSO”) was one of the first peacekeeping operations established by
the Security Council. It was created with the consent of States to supervise
the truce and Armistice Agreements between the newly formed State of
Israel and four of its Arab neighbours in 1948-1949. Such observers were
not armed. When Dag Hammarksjold was Secretary-General, he made
UNTSO a traditional model for United Nations peacekeeping.
The 1956 Suez conflict provided the United Nations with its first
opportunity to deploy an armed peacekeeping force, the United Nations
Emergency Force (“UNEF”). UNEF’s primary mandates under General
Assembly Resolution 1000 were to secure a ceasefire between British,
French, Israeli and Egyptian forces in the Sinai Peninsula, direct the
withdrawal of the non-Egyptian forces from Egyptian territory and patrol
the border areas. Also, INEF was responsible for achieving the aims of the
Egypt-Israeli Armistice Agreement. Dag Hammarskjold indicated that
although it was not a military force controlling temporarily the territory in
which it was stationed, UNEF was more than just an observer because its
troops were clearly intended to be deployed for peaceful purposes.30
A larger and potentially more dangerous deployment of peacekeepers
occurred when the United Nations established the Operation in the Congo
(ONUC) from 1960-1964. Originally, ONUC was set up to defuse the
separatist civil war taking place in the recently decolonised Congo.
Belgium, the former colonial power, was required to remove its troops
from the Congo under the United Nation’s mandate. Although not
30

United Nations Department of Public Information, The Blue Helmets: A Review of
United Nations Peace-keeping 18 UN Doc DP1/1065 (1990) at 48.
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deployed for the purpose of initiating any use of force, ONUC’s mandate
included assisting the Congolese government with the restoration of law
and order. After the government disintegrated and attacks on United
Nations personnel took place in February 1961, the Security Council
authorised ONUC to “take immediately all appropriate measures to prevent
the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including…the use of force, if
necessary, in the last resort.”31
The mandate was expanded in November 1961. By January 1963 ONUC
numbered some 20,000 fully armed troops including tanks, heavy artillery
and fighter jets.32 This operation reflected the traditional model that Dag
Hammarskjold established in 1949 because it was not confrontational in
character nor subject to a strict military discipline. When ONUC’s mandate
was expanded in 1961 to remove foreign mercenaries, it broke new ground.
The troops were authorised to move freely within the Congo and their
military intervention successfully prevented the secession of Katanga.33
However, this model was abandoned by subsequent mandates but was
resurrected three decades later with the end of the Cold War.
CLASSICAL PEACEKEEPING PARADIGMS
The United Nations Charter does not expressly make peacekeeping a nonenforcement action. Since the Charter was signed in 1945, there have been
26 United Nations peacekeeping operations. Articles 24 and 36 on the
Security Council procedures for the settlement of disputes impliedly
provided for the early peacekeeping missions that involved unarmed
observers and that were authorised by the Security Council. However, this
legal authority for UNEF and ONUC operations was subject to
controversy. When the Soviet Union and France refused to pay their
apportioned dues for those missions, the International Court of Justice was
given an opportunity in an advisory opinion to pronounce on the legality of
withholding funds including the lawfulness of peacekeeping operations.
This was the Certain Expenses Case.34
31

General Assembly Resolution 161 of 1961.
Durch WJ, “The UN operation in Congo” in Durch WJ (ed), The Evolution of UN
Peacekeeping: Case Study and Comparative Analysis (1993, New York, St Martin’s
Press).
33
United Nations Department of Public Information, The Blue Helmets: A Review of
United Nations Peace-keeping 18 UN Doc DP1/1065 (1990) at 250.
34
[1962] International Court of Justice Reports 151.
32

10

[2000] Australian International Law Journal

In the above case, the International Court of Justice held that Article 14 of
the United Nations Charter empowered both the Security Council and the
General Assembly to authorise peacekeeping operations.35 The Court
rejected the view that Article 43 agreements were required to establish
peacekeeping forces and instead held that the operations were not coercive
nor enforcement actions that required such authorisation. Thus, this case
may be used as authority for the proposition that both Chapters VI and VII
of the Charter have provisions that authorise the establishment of United
Nations peacekeeping operations.
The early peacekeeping campaigns of the United Nations had three
common elements or guiding principles. First, the operations should have
the political support or at least the acquiescence of the five permanent
members of the Security Council. Secondly, the consent and cooperation of
the local parties to the dispute should be seen as essential for the
deployment of United Nations peacekeepers. And thirdly, the neutrality or
independence of the United Nations should be a primary ingredient for an
effective peacekeeping operation. These guiding principles have come to
distinguish peacekeeping operations in conflict situations from the more
aggressive peace-making actions.36
The concept of self-defence and the principles of non-intervention and
sovereignty were blurred and modified during the Congo operation. While
peacekeepers today continue to heed the principle of self-defence, the
political and mandate complexities of operations such as those in Iraq and
the former Yugoslavia have blurred the strict neutrality and impartiality of
these operations. Recently, the United Nations authorised its Members to
undertake enforcement action aimed at more specific goals that required
the use of troops in areas of conflict.37
35

Article 14 provides that “the General Assembly may recommend measures for the
peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of origin, which it deems likely to impair
the general welfare or friendly relations among nations.”
36
Fink, From peacekeeping to peace enforcement: the blurring of the mandate for the use
of force in maintaining international peace and security”, (1995) 19 Maryland Journal of
International Trade and Law 1, 14, 15.
37
Refer Security Council Resolution 82 of 1950 on Korea, Security Council Resolutions
660 and 678 of 1990 on Iraq, Security Council Resolution 794 of 1992 on Somalia,
Security Council Resolution 929 of 1994 on Rwanda, Security Council Resolution 940 of
1994 on Haiti, Security Council Resolutions 770,781,787, 816 of 1992-1994 on Bosnia,
and Security Council Resolution 1299 of 1999 on East Timor.
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RISE OF PEACEMAKING
The traditional peacekeeping status and role of the United Nations have
been changed from non-confrontational, with the consent and goodwill of
the host State, to an aggressive presence lacking the goodwill of the host
State. In practice, it may be observed that usually the host State had either
been “bent” by the international community or the change in mandate had
been necessitated by conditions that jeopardise the lives of United Nations
troops in the arena of conflict.
Enforcement Action
In June 1950 the Security Council authorised the use of force in a military
enforcement action for the first time after North Korean troops crossed the
38th parallel into South Korea. The Security Council met on 25 June and
noted that the armed attack on South Korea by forces from the North
constituted a breach of the peace under Article 39 of the Charter.38 Two
days later the Security Council in Resolution 83 recommended that United
Nations Members furnish such assistance to South Korea as was necessary
to repel the armed attack and restore international peace and security to the
region.39 When the Security Council could not use the Military Staff
Committee that was established under Article 47 of the Charter to direct
the military action, it established a unified military command with an
American commander who reported to the President and Joint Chiefs of
Staff of the United States.40
Although this enforcement action was the first time that the United Nations
authorised the use of force under Chapter VII of the Charter, curiously
none of the resolutions mentioned either Chapter VII or Article 42. A
reason could have been the nature and military scope of the operation that
seemed to involve the United Nations “sub-contracting” its peace
enforcement powers to the United States. Further, this had taken place
during a period of complex politics and international and military relations
involving the superpowers that effectively frustrated any definitive or
decisive action by the Security Council.41
38

Security Council Resolution 82 of 1950.
Security Council Resolution 83 of 1950.
40
Security Council Resolution 84 of 1950.
41
For a more detailed analysis see Arend AC and anor, International Law and the Use of
39
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The United Nations was able to act in this situation in the middle of the
Cold War due to the absence of the Soviet Union from the Security Council
when the crucial vote was taken.42 However, the text of the resolution
mirrored caution and provided for a formal United Nations command. By
providing for General Assembly involvement in the operation in this
manner it aimed at preventing a political backlash from the Soviet Union.
However, in reality, the operation was essentially a United States operation
and this is an important fact because subsequent United Nations military
actions in the post Cold War era involving the aggressive use of force have
had no formal United Nations command.43
The end of the Cold War allowed the Security Council to authorise the use
of force in a large-scale enforcement action for the second time. After Iraq
invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990 the Security Council very quickly
condemned the action and demanded the immediate and unconditional
withdrawal of Iraq’s forces.44 In response to Iraq’s subsequent claim that it
had annexed Kuwait, the Security Council in Resolution 665 on 25 August
authorised the deployment of naval forces to enforce the sanctions
provided in Resolution 661. In addition, the Security Council acted in
Resolution 678 on 29 November by authorising its Members to use all
necessary means to uphold and implement Resolution 660 and restore
international peace and security to the area. These actions helped to prevent
the fragmentation of world opinion on the United States’ claim that such
United Nations authority was unnecessary.
Using the actions in the Korean peninsula and the Persian Gulf as
examples, for a time it appeared that the United Nations would most likely
take action only when there was large-scale aggression by one State against
another State. Furthermore, it appeared that it would do so only where the
vital interests of at least some of the permanent members of the Security
Force beyond the United Nations Charter Paradigm (1993, Routledge, New York) 11-19.
42
The Soviet delegation was absent from the meetings of the Security Council in protest
against Taiwan representing “China” in the Security Council (instead of the People’s
Republic of China).
43
For example, Operation Desert Storm during the Gulf War, the military intervention in
Haiti, and the Somalia humanitarian intervention were all under a United States command.
On the other hand, the recent humanitarian intervention in East Timor was under an
Australian command.
44
United Nations Security Council resolution 660 of 1990.
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Council were at stake.45 There have been departures from this view
recently as seen in Somalia and East Timor where the use of force was
justified on humanitarian grounds and political or economic considerations.
Intervention in Domestic Affairs
The principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of a State is
grounded in Article 2(7) of the Charter. Usually, humanitarian intervention
is defined within the context of a State or States using armed force to
protect a population from large-scale human rights violations. Although the
Charter does not explicitly mention the use of force for humanitarian
purposes, the United Nations authorised relief operations in northern Iraq
and Somalia to protect human rights. Recently, this was the basis for
intervention by InterFET in East Timor.
(i)

Kuwait

In response to renewed uprisings after his defeat in the Gulf War, Saddam
Hussein’s military began to attack the populations in northern and southern
Iraq to quell the uprisings. The renewed post Gulf War onslaught caused
two million Kurds to leave the region and flee into Turkey and Iran. Since
they have been denied entry into Turkey they remain in the inhabitable
mountains of northern Iraq with reports of hundreds of deaths each day.46
At the behest of Turkey and France, the Security Council adopted
Resolution 688 on 5 April 1991 that condemned the repression of the Iraqi
civilian population and demanded that Iraq end the repression immediately.
The section of the Resolution on intervention is contained in the third
paragraph where the Security Council insisted that Iraq should allow
immediate access by international humanitarian organisations to all those
in need of assistance and make available all necessary facilities for their
operations in Iraq.47 The acrimonious debate in the Security Council over
45

See Fifoot, “Functions and powers, and interventions: United Nations action in respect
of human rights and humanitarian intervention” in Rodley NS (editor), To Loose the
Bands of Wickedness: International Intervention in Defence of Human Rights (1992,
Brassey’s, London) 48.
46
For a detailed exposition see Freedman and anor, “ ‘Safe Havens’ for Kurds in post war
Iraq” in Rodley NS (editor), To Loose the Bands of Wickedness: International
Intervention in Defence of Human Rights (1992, Brassey’s, London) 44-45.
47
At the height of the Safe Havens Operation over 21,000 American, British and French
troops were deployed in the region: ibid.
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Resolution 688 indicated that the Resolution had been a controversy.
Yemen and China argued that the intervention based on humanitarian
grounds contravened the principle in Article 2(7) and would lead to a
dangerous precedent.48 Resolution 688 dictated that Iraq would forgo its
right to territorial integrity and allow the Allies to go into a host State to
establish a relief operation without that State’s consent.
(ii)

Somalia

In January 1991 President Said Barre’s dictatorial regime in Somalia was
overthrown by combating rival factions resulting in the end of an effective
government. The disjointed civil war that fragmented Somalia into
fiefdoms under various warlords who presided over clan alliances
prevented the transport of food and humanitarian aid to millions of starving
Somalis. In January 1992 the situation deteriorated to such a degree that the
Security Council unanimously enacted a weapons embargo on Somalia.49
During 1992 the Security Council sent a team to observe the administration
of humanitarian aid there and deployed 50 United Nations observers by
creating the United Nations Operation in Somalia (“UNOSOM”).50
The escalating chaos and civil anarchy required the Security Council to
invoke Chapter VII of the Charter and increase the troop levels of
UNOSOM peacekeepers. In November 1992 the United States offered to
lead a military operation in order to deliver humanitarian aid to the Somalis
following calls by the then Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali. As a
result, the Security Council adopted Resolution 794 unanimously. The
resolution authorised the Secretary-General and United Nations Members
to cooperate to use all necessary means to establish a secure environment
for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia as soon as possible.51 Based
on this resolution, the United States sent a large armed contingent into
48

Rodley, “Collective intervention to protect human rights and civilian populations: the
ntervention in Defence of Human Rights (1992, Brassey’s, London) 31. Yemen voted
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Somalia. The Security Council’s mandate to use force was unique because
the operation was not in response to an act of aggression. The catalyst for
this explicit humanitarian action under Chapter VII was Article 39, which
determined that the continuing civil war in Somalia was a threat to
international peace and security.52
(iii)

East Timor

The changing status of the United Nations mandate is exemplified by
Security Council Resolution 1264 that authorised the creation of InterFET.
After the 30 August referendum in East Timor that was sponsored by the
United Nations and following growing evidence of political cleansing,
systematic torture, execution and large-scale organised detention and
translocation of pro-independence East Timorese, InterFET was mandated
to undertake a full military operation. In fact, the first and second drafts of
Security Council Resolution 126453 had referred to the Indonesian army’s
involvement in the violence in East Timor. However, this reference was
omitted from the final draft to facilitate the unconditional withdrawal of
Indonesian troops from the area and placate Indonesian outrage at the
United Nations operation.54
Shortly after the United Nations authorised the troop deployment in East
Timor there were reports of the militia moving into West Timor who set up
training camps and military bases there.55 In hindsight, this justified to a
greater extent the establishment of InterFET by the Security Council.
Basis for Enforcement Action
Enforcement actions under Chapter VII, such as those in Korea and Iraq,
are clearly permissible under the Charter when authorised by the Security
Council. The trans-boundary impact of a humanitarian violation is easier to
52
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gauge than the measurement of a violation’s severity, which acts as the
trigger for Security Council action within the terms of Article 39 and its
reference to “threat to peace”. The trans-boundary effect of the refugee
problem that was created in Iraq by the exodus of the Kurds gave the
Security Council some leverage when determining that a threat to
international peace and security existed in Iraq. With greater emphasis now
on human rights as seen by the establishment of InterFET to halt the
bloodbath in East Timor it appears that the Security Council’s expanded
interpretation of what constitutes a threat to the peace includes severe
humanitarian violations now.56
As peace-keeping and peace-making operations blend with humanitarian
interventions, proponents of humanitarian intervention point to Articles 1,
55-56 of the Charter to demonstrate the Charter’s emphasis on the
protection of human rights and the maintenance of international peace and
security.57 Several norms in international human rights law have emerged
since the signing of the Charter. While efforts have been aimed at general
human rights at a universal level, including the Universal Declaration, the
ICCPR and the ICESCR, other instruments protect against specific abuses
such as genocide,58 war crimes and crimes against humanity,59 slavery60
and torture.61
56
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Although the doctrine of sovereignty continues to play a pivotal role in
international relations today, it has been weakened by the growing idea that
through collective United Nations authorisation, its Members have the right
to intervene when a human rights violation threatens international peace.62
A norm has also developed that they have the responsibility to ensure that
any human rights violations anywhere are addressed.63 The forcible
interventions in Somalia and northern Iraq support this proposition and in
East Timor the international community bent the will of the Indonesian
government in spite of the latter calling the intervention an unacceptable
violation of its territorial integrity and an abuse of its political
independence.
Thus, humanitarian intervention is a new consideration for the international
and collective use of force as the body of human rights law grows. When
the Security Council had authorised the use force to combat the widespread
and flagrant violations of international humanitarian law, its peace
enforcement measures had gradually overtaken peacekeeping missions.
This was evidenced when the mandates of UNOSOM and UNPROFOR
were subsequently expanded. They showed that when peacekeepers, who
are generally trained in non-violent reaction and self-defence, are
confronted by hostility they have to adopt an aggressive dimension and the
missions come to resemble enforcement actions ultimately.
The situation in the former Balkan republics presented the United Nations
with a challenge that tested both the organisation’s ability to respond to a
rapidly growing conflict situation and the efficacy of non-traditional
peacekeeping operations. This crisis, which had progressively escalated
since 1991, is an example of the inherent dangers that the organisation may
face in a dynamic arena of potential as well as real conflict.
The negative publicity and criticism of UNPROFOR are not so much a
reflection of the military calibre of the peacekeepers but rather the over62
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politicising of peacekeeping issues in the United Nations. The mandate of
such forces as an issue dogged discussions in the General Assembly and
Security Council during the Cold War era when such forces had virtually
no military capability. When the Cold War ended, it was expected that the
United Nations could quickly revise its guiding principles on the mandate
of peacekeeping forces including their status as reactive rather than
proactive. However, this was railroaded in 1993 by squabbling between the
United States, Canada and Europe64 on the command of a possible
permanent peacekeeping force. Consequently, the issue of the mandate of
United Nations forces continues to be controversial but it is heartening to
know that the organisation is open to new political perspectives and
military dimensions when it engages in peacekeeping efforts.
The possible military conflict in East Timor led to two phases in the United
Nations’ military intervention there. First, an Australian-led international
force had to wrestle control of East Timor from the pro-Indonesia militia.
Secondly, pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1299 of 25 October
1999 this was followed by the deployment of a traditional peacekeeping
force. It seems that UNPROFOR’s impotence in Srebenica and the lessons
learnt in the former Yogoslavia drove the Security Council to give its force
in East Timor a wider berth in its military operations. The idea was not
consent and goodwill but military expedience in establishing a robust and
internationally supported socio-political infrastructure in East Timor to
curb human rights atrocities and protect fundamental human rights.
CHAPTER VII ACTION
Enforcement actions under Chapter VII of the Charter are legal and the use
of force is lawful if authorised by the Security Council for such purposes.
For example, the measures authorised in Bosnia are explicit Chapter VII
actions. As such, the measures fall within the exception of the last sentence
of Article 2(7) relating to Chapter VII enforcement actions. Due to the
increasing frequency with which the Security Council has initiated Chapter
VII actions on the basis of humanitarian violations, it is worthwhile
examining the status of interventions for humanitarian purposes in the light
of its action in East Timor. It has been argued that “genuine instances of
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See generally Powers, “The case for a permanent United Nations peacekeeping force”,
Daily Nation, 13 April 1993, Special Reports Column.

19

[2000] Australian International Law Journal
humanitarian intervention have been rare, if they have occurred at all.”65
Commentators point to the non-humanitarian interest or motives of the
intervener, the political or economic considerations and the fact that no
intervening State has used the pure rationale of humanitarian intervention
to justify its use of force.66
The intervention in the Balkans was contentious since it was a “mixed
conflict”.67 Nevertheless, it may be characterised as a predominantly
humanitarian disaster that required Chapter VII action by the United
Nations. However, the intervention in Somalia and East Timor is a strong
challenge to the assertion that humanitarian interventions usually have
underlying political and economic considerations. The locations of the
territories and the absence of any visible or invisible overarching sociopolitical or economic interests by the intervening powers point to purely
humanitarian considerations aimed at fulfilling the lofty humanitarian
ideals of the international community
Even in the former Yugoslavia, several Security Council resolutions have
defined the humanitarian bases of intervention: the trans-boundary effects
of the refugee situation in Bosnia,68 the inability to deliver humanitarian
aid due to the civil war,69 and ethnic cleansing and other violations of
humanitarian law.70 The findings that these circumstances were the bases
for a threat to international peace and security are grounded in the
recognition that the external refugee problem and the grave and systematic
domestic humanitarian violations both warranted Chapter VII action.
The human rights situation in East Timor, a purely internal crisis, triggered
the application of Article 39. The reports on political cleansing, massive
and organised detention, translocation of the population, and systematic
torture and murder of pro-independence East Timorese certainly made a
compelling case for United Nations action. In any event, although the use
65
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of humanitarian intervention to prevent these violations has not yet been
accepted as an exception to Article 2(4) on the prohibition against the use
of force, the use of Chapter VII is legal and presents strong evidence of
emerging customary law. The prospect of this type of humanitarian
diplomacy will increase potentially the number of original peace
enforcement operations. It is foreseeable that in future peacekeepers will
find their safety compromised as their missions involve enforcement action
requiring more complex and refined rules of engagement in hostile
environments.
The comprehensive restructure of peacekeeping operations in 1992 by the
United Nations seems to herald the genesis of a new role for peacekeeping
and peacemaking. Traditionally, the Office of Special Political Affairs
managed peacekeeping operations. The Office was administered by two
Under-Secretaries-General (“USG”) who reported to the SecretaryGeneral. One USG managed field operations and mediation efforts
associated with peace enforcement while the other was a political
troubleshooter for the Secretary-General. Now, the peacemaking functions
have been transferred to the Secretary-General’s Executive Office resulting
in a complete separation of planning from political issues. This structure
reflects the traditional view in the United Nations that there is a clear
distinction between peacekeepers and peace enforcers and that the two
should be kept apart. Peace enforcers receive military training while
peacekeepers are trained in non-violent responses to provocation.71
The 1992 restructure included the creation of an Office of Peacekeeping
Operations as one of four designated departments that reported to the
Secretary-General directly. The restructure streamlined the peacekeeping
administration and put in place a formal relationship between peacekeepers
and peacemakers. However, as the missions become blurred and
conventional peacekeeping forces become gradually engaged in more
aggressive Chapter VII actions, training, equipment needs, command
structures and the rules of engagement on the use of force will have to be
reviewed to reflect the changing nature of peacekeeping.72
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THE HUMANITARIAN CUSTODIANSHIP
Humanitarian intervention by the United Nations in non-State entities
follows a history of participation in their elections when they are
transitioning from colonial rule to independence.73 In contrast to its role in
supervising and monitoring elections within the decolonisation context and
sometimes for the purge of unpopular leftist regimes, the United Nations
has now begrudgingly accepted the responsibility of intervention in the
socio-political processes of States that violate fundamental human rights.
Initially, when confronted by appeals for intervention of this nature the
organisation had been unwilling and unprepared to respond.74 This
reluctance was largely due to two reasons. First, there were the shackles
that States had placed on the United Nations through a broad interpretation
of the doctrine of sovereignty as enshrined in the Charter. Secondly, the
United Nations preferred not to adopt a position or policy that could rock
the global political boat.75
Slowly, however, the United Nations has begun to develop a tenuous
international consensus on its new role in human rights matters.76
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Reflecting deep dogmatic reluctance among its Members and within its
bureaucracy to expand its role in promoting the protection of fundamental
human rights, the organisation has limited its intervention to more welldefined circumstances, primarily in cases with a clear international
dimension. However, the circumstances surrounding the recent intervention
in East Timor have forced its hand and it must now address and develop
the international norms for intervention to protect civilian populations from
mass slaughter.77
The United Nations should expand and deepen its commitment to human
rights values by abandoning the requirement of an international dimension
and moving the substance of its involvement beyond the inter-State
spectrum to the intra-state arena.78 It should transform its policy of limited
involvement in the political affairs of States into a broader policy that
creates a human rights custodianship. This new role was what the Kurds,
the East Timorese and other oppressed populations around the world had
been expecting and demanding of the organisation. In the past, it had
linked some of its limited humanitarian intervention to efforts to promote
human rights within the domestic arena. However, any link between human
intervention and human rights obligations had been secondary to the goals
found in its Charter, including the primary responsibility of the Security
Council on the maintenance of international peace and security, which had
been the primary motivation for its missions thus far.
If the importance of human rights in United Nations missions79 is down
played, the missions may become disconnected from the goal of enduring
peace. They should be used to promote substantive changes in adversely
affected societies and in the global community as a whole. More
importantly, the changes should preserve the worth and dignity of world
citizens, existing and future. So far, the missions have been ad hoc,
reactive and narrowly focused on solving specific international
emergencies.80 This is a fundamentally flawed approach that teaches States
nothing on the disapproval of the international community to human rights
77
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abuses and the inter-relation of national and international standards in the
entire human rights spectrum.81 Until this lesson is brought home to States,
human rights abuses will continue with impunity and go unabated and
unchecked.
There is an emerging international consensus that humanitarian
intervention is justified if human rights atrocities take place. This is
consistent with the original idea behind the establishment of the United
Nations before the organisation succumbed to the tensions and divisions
that developed during the Cold War.82 Nonetheless, the promotion of
human rights and their protection by States are important values. The need
to adhere to a comprehensive body of fundamental human rights provides a
compelling justification for United Nations involvement in the political
affairs of rogue States and it also provides a worthy rationale for the
organisation’s continued existence. This rationale should be sufficient to
justify the United Nations’ involvement in a State’s political affairs if the
State deliberately and arbitrarily alters the nature and content of its
citizens’ rights. Moreover, it should be the case even where its obligation
to maintain international peace and security is not a direct issue.
The selfish interests of States should not be permitted to derail the human
rights process. They should not be permitted to use the concept of
sovereignty to avoid the issues that clearly transcend national boundaries
within this context. China’s Foreign Minister used arguments such as “the
history of China and other developing countries shows [that] the
sovereignty of a country is the prerequisite for the basis of the human rights
that the people of that country can enjoy”.83 However, they are simply an
apologia by States with poor human rights records and a history of brutal
political repression.
The development of a new United Nations policy to generate, safeguard
81
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and deepen the entitlement of individual citizens to their fundamental
rights should proceed and be prevented from derailment. United Nations
Resolution 48/141 of 20 December 1993, which establishes the position of
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, provides that “all
human rights – civil, cultural, economic, political and social are universal,
indivisible, interdependent and interrelated”. The Resolution recognises
that States have a duty to promote and protect human rights. Founded upon
this obligation a human rights custodianship policy will represent a
significantly expanded role for the organisation and the most favourable
form of governance in ensuring that States promote and protect human
rights. This policy would help expand and deepen global understanding and
the reception of human rights in general, including their indivisibility in
particular.84
United Nations electoral missions have clarified important elements of the
right to political participation, thus weakening the barriers to the
advancement of international human rights. The policy of custodianship
would go beyond the current emphasis on the technical validity of State
actions based on sovereignty85 and take advantage of current opportunities
to secure gains in human rights that have followed the end of the Cold War.
Perhaps, more importantly, in responding to global dissatisfaction with the
current ad hoc, reactive, and constricted approach to human rights
violations,86 a new custodianship policy would focus international attention
on actions deemed domestic or “private” by States and forces that
perpetuate human rights abuses and inequality around the world.87
Since its founding in 1945 the United Nations has promulgated instruments
that are collectively equivalent to an International Rights88 and helped
84
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gather international consensus for the idea that the populations of States
have rights under international law. This extends to the protection of the
rights, even against the government. Beginning with the Charter and the
Universal Declaration, the United Nations has constructed a normative
framework for the realisation of rights for the people.89 The framework has
been sustained over time by the actions of States in signing and ratifying
various international human rights and related instruments, some of which
are now part of customary international law. The international
collaborative efforts involving United Nations organs, human rights
workers and others have helped publicise the plight of the oppressed
millions who yearn for more personal liberties and freedom from arbitrary
detention, execution and political purges.
Unfortunately, in interpreting its responsibilities to promote friendly
relations among states, the United Nations has failed to give peoples, and
thus human rights, the necessary priority. Instead, it has limited the scope
of its responsibilities by adopting a shallow conception of its human rights
obligations. This attitude does not permit a full response when States deny
fundamental human rights.90 Further, those who assume that its highly
publicised intervention missions are driven primarily by human rights
concerns may misunderstand its role in the domestic affairs of States.91 The
fact is that the United Nations intervenes only in few cases and when it
does so the scope of its involvement is limited and often dependent on the
commitment of States to act for and on its behalf.92
Generally, the United Nations has limited its mandate to promote human
rights in States to those instances with a clear international dimension
only93 and where the trans-boundary effect of national excesses has been
89

See United Nations Centre for Human Rights, United Nations, Human Rights and Elections: Handbook on the Legal, Technical and Human Rights Aspects of Elections, United
Nations Doc HR/p/ot/2 (1994).
90
As noted by Human Rights Watch, human rights have been treated as a dispensable
luxury, not as a central element in the success of United Nations peacekeeping and
humanitarian operations: refer Human Rights Watch, The Lost Agenda: Human Rights
and United Field Operations (1993, United Nations, New York) 1.
91
Ibid.
92
For example, pursuant to United Nations authorisation, the United States led the
multinational force in the 1990 Gulf War and intervened in Haiti in 1994. More recently,
Australia led the United Nations force in East Timor.
93
In 1992 the need to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of Bosnia,
found in United Nations Security Council Resolution 775 of 1992, was made the basis for

26

[2000] Australian International Law Journal
profound. It has received a significant number of appeals from States for
more substantial involvement and a clear description of its role as the
human rights custodian. This follows its inflexibility and failure to provide
guiding principles for humanitarian interventions as shown by its insistence
on using the ill-defined, unclear sobriquet “international dimension”. This
reflects the “Age of Rights”, an expression that Louis Henkin coined and
used for his book’s title,94 which champions the organisation’s broad
human rights responsibility and provides for humanitarian intervention.
The current United Nations policy of pegging interventions to the transboundary effects of human rights abuses and international outrage suffers
from two significant weaknesses. First, in the 1990s it intervened twice
only, Bosnia in 1992 and East Timor in 1999, both in the face of massive
internal human rights atrocities. Secondly, after World War II it promoted a
false meaning of sovereignty and non-interference in domestic affairs, thus
limiting the scope of its human rights contributions. As a result, the
weaknesses have maintained a United Nations focus on the interests of
States and governments, not the people. They also reflect the traditional
perspective that the organisation’s overriding purpose is to regulate the
conduct of States vis-à-vis each other under Article 1(1) of the Charter
rather than promote the interests or concerns of the people within the State.
INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY
International peace and security are of paramount importance to the United
Nations. Article 39 of the Charter gives the Security Council broad powers
to determine when peace is threatened or breached. Yet, this limits the
ambit of Security Council concern and provides an excuse for non-action
when human rights violations occur. This restriction is not necessarily coextensive with the organisation’s simultaneous implied responsibility to
promote human rights. The attempt to combine the responsibility for
human rights with the international peace and security responsibility, rather
than a stand alone human rights responsibility, has led to complex efforts at
inventing persuasive excuses for legitimising missions authorised by the
the Security Council’s demand for access to the camps and detention centres for the
purposes of delivering humanitarian aid. The Security Council rationalised its substantial
involvement in Bosnia by turning the sovereignty argument around. For further details,
see Fink, “From peacekeeping to peace enforcement: the blurring of the mandate for the
use of force”, (1995) 19 Maryland Journal of International Trade and Law 1, 33-35.
94
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United Nations. However, many conflicts implicating serious human rights
concerns are reasonably contained within domestic borders and their direct
impact on international peace and security are often not articulated.95
The United Nations finds itself in juxtaposition. On the one hand, the
concept of a threat to or a breach of international peace and security would
lose international legitimacy if it were relied upon to justify every instance
where it acts in support of oppressed people. On the other hand, if it adopts
a technically justifiable or a broader interpretation of the concept, it risks
losing credibility in the eyes of States that are ever wary of gunboat
diplomacy.96 The key effect of linking human rights to international peace
and security has been to constrain, rather than enhance, the organisation’s
role in developing and defining human rights standards. Yet, at times the
organisation should be permitted to act in support of human rights where
no reasonable threat to or breach of international peace and security is
obvious. Seemingly, the Charter anticipated this situation by not
constraining the use of coercive measures when promoting human rights
norms.97
The Charter, the Universal Declaration, the ICCPR and the ICESCR
provide the foundation for United Nations involvement in domestic
political affairs in the name of human rights and embody an assertive
vision of its human rights custodianship role. This should be independent
of the specific acquiescence of States to human rights fact-finding missions
or findings of international dimensions in a bid to nurture and advance
fundamental human rights universally. The Charter begins with a strong
commitment to human rights promotion, featured prominently alongside
the post World War II goal of preventing future international conflicts and
conditions that foster such conflicts.98 The Charter’s origin is found in the
preoccupation of allied war time leaders with the saving of “succeeding
95
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generations from the scourge of war”.99 An overriding concern of the
Charter’s drafters was to eliminate or reduce the causes and consequences
of international conflict and immediately following this goal was an
explicit commitment in the Preamble to the Charter to:
reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of
the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of
nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice
and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources
of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress
and better standards of life in larger freedom…
Scholars trace the origins of modern international human rights law to the
horrors of the holocaust and other Nazi atrocities during World War II.100
The Charter was the first step in the “codification of international standards
to protect human rights.”101 It laid the foundation for what has been dubbed
the International Bill of Rights. The Universal Declaration may be viewed
as an elaboration of the human rights commitment that is only briefly
articulated in the Charter. In many respects the ICCPR (including its
Optional Protocol) and the ICESCR elaborate on the commitment
expressed in the Charter and the Universal Declaration.
Although the Charter does not contain an explicit right of humanitarian
intervention or a role for the United Nations in the socio-political processes
of Member States102 its human rights provisions lay the foundation for this.
The maintenance of international peace and security and the principle of
self-determination have motivated past and current United Nations
missions. However, the recognition of a global responsibility for human
rights that is rooted in the Charter should provide a better legal and
political justification for the United Nations promoting human rights
through various means including a deepened involvement in State affairs.
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This interpretation of the Charter places human rights at the centre of the
debate without denigrating the pivotal role of the organisation concerning
international peace and security.
CONCLUSION
Getting the United Nations to act assertively on human rights will neither
be easy or popular. There has been a strong tendency within the
organisation to treat itself as essentially an association for States mainly
concerned with international conflict management. The interests of “the
Peoples of the United Nations”103 were long ago subsumed by the needs of
its Member States104 when they acted in the name of their citizens. It
occurred as well when they resisted a meaningful role for the organisation
or the global community in human rights including accountability for the
abuses of the same citizens. Yet at the same time, they have bound
themselves to international instruments that guarantee fundamental
rights.105 South Africa during the apartheid era is a classic example. For
decades, it objected to United Nations involvement and condemnation
regarding its treatment of non-white citizens during this period. However,
other States, including those that rejected South Africa’s position and
supported United Nations intervention in South Africa, had also similarly
rejected the organisation’s scrutiny of their own human rights practices.106
Like South Africa, they did so in the name of domestic sovereignty.
The United Nations should free itself from the shackles of the classical
interpretation of the doctrine of sovereignty107 and the principle of selfdetermination when it considers engaging in pro-rights efforts in domestic
affairs. A clear-cut human rights justification should unapologetically be
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advanced to support its interventionist missions.108 For constitutional and
political support, it should draw on its human rights responsibilities rooted
in the Charter and supporting instruments, including the incessant demands
of various populations for its involvement. The fact remains that a broader
and more assertive involvement by the United Nations in the domestic
affairs of States may cast it as a “globocop” and lead it into a dark and ugly
political storm. Whether it is able to weather the storm as the international
human rights custodian remains to be seen.
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